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ABSTRACT
We study reputational herding in ﬁnancial markets in a laboratory experiment. In the spirit of
Dasgupta and Prat [2008], career concerns are introduced in a sequential asset market where wages
for investors are set by subjects in the role of employers. Employers can observe investment
behavior, but not investors’ ability types. Thereby, reputational incentives may arise endogenously.
We ﬁnd that a sizable fraction of investors follows an established trend even in a setting where
there are no reputational incentives. In a setting where there are reputational concerns, they do not
seem to create substantial herd behavior.
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Introduction
They [equity investors] are not paid to make money, or
even to beat the market. Rather, they are paid not to do
worse than their peers. Going down with the market
would not be so bad for them; missing out on a rally like
in 2009, when stocks doubled in barely two years, would
be catastrophic for their career. —Comment by J.
Authers, “Dangers of Market Herd Stampedes,” Finan-
cial Times, November 30, 2011
Motivation
The popular press frequently alludes to herd behavior as a
potential source of mispricing in ﬁnancial markets. Also,
there is a substantial academic literature (both theoretical
and empirical) on this phenomenon. Perhaps surprisingly,
even when investors are purely proﬁt-maximizing, herding
might arise in ﬁnancial markets, and market prices might
fail to converge to true values even in the long run. One
strand of the literature suggests that this might be due to
“social learning” on part of individual investors (see, e.g.,
Park and Sabourian [2011], Avery and Zemsky [1998]). In
particular, these authors introduce information cascade
models (in the spirit of Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and
Welch [1992], Banerjee [1992], Welch [1992]) into a Glos-
ten and Milgrom [1985] style sequential asset market, and
they show that, despite a ﬂexiblemarket price, herd behavior
might occur.1
As the above quotation suggests, another potential source
of herd behavior is reputational concerns of individual
investors (e.g., fund managers) vis-a-vis outside observers
(e.g., potential future employers). In particular, Dasgupta
and Prat [2008] introduce career concerns (in the spirit of
Scharfstein and Stein [1990]) in the Glosten and Milgrom
[1985] model by assuming that investors are of various
(unobservable) ability types. In analogy to Avery and Zem-
sky [1998], Dasgupta and Prat [2008] show that, following a
number of trades in the same direction, the proﬁt from trad-
ing an asset becomes smaller because prices get more pre-
cise. At the same time, if one’s private information runs
counter to the behavior of earlier investors, acting on the
own signal implies a reputational loss, which might make it
optimal to herd. Intuitively, if several predecessors have
bought the same asset, with high probability a trade contrar-
ian to predecessors’ decisions and according to the own sig-
nal would turn out to be unsuccessful. As a consequence,
the respective investor would incur a reputational loss as he
or she would be considered as a low-ability investor. Hence,
it might be optimal to neglect one’s own information and to
herd on predecessors’ decisions in order not to harm one’s
reputation. From that moment onwards, prices remain con-
stant and all subsequent investors follow the crowd.2
Of course, beyond social-learning or reputation-based
explanations, there might still be other reasons for herd
behavior. For example, herding might also be driven by
investors following their “animal spirits” as Akerlof and
Shiller [2008, p. 1] have put it.3
Experimental setup
In the present paper, we turn to the laboratory to study
whether Dasgupta and Prat’s [2008] theory of reputa-
tional herding can explain ﬁnancial market behavior.
Their theory suggests that investors engage in herd
behavior if they face reputational incentives and asset
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prices get sufﬁciently precise (i.e., proﬁts from trading
get sufﬁciently small).4
In the experiment, subjects in the role of ﬁnancial invest-
orsmake the decision of which of two assets to buy. Subjects’
investment behavior in two treatments is studied via the
strategy method. While in a treatment investment subjects
make their decisions in the absence of career concerns, in a
treatment reputation career concerns are incorporated
endogenously. For their investment choice, investors
observe investment decisions of predecessors and a signal
about which asset is the successful one. Investors can be of
two types. Each investor is either a good type (and receives
an informative signal about the assets’ value), or a bad type
(and receives an uninformative signal). Subjects are not
aware of their type.
In treatment investment, the investor’s proﬁt consists
of the ﬁnal payoff of the asset bought minus the price
paid for it. In this setup, according to theory, investors
should always follow their own signal and buy the
respective asset. That is, there should be sincere trading
only. Treatment reputation additionally introduces prin-
cipals who set wages for each investor based on the
observed investment choices and the actual outcome of
the asset. Investors thus receive wages set by the princi-
pals on top of earning proﬁts from investing in the asset.
In treatment reputation, investors should engage in herd
behavior and neglect their own signal if a sufﬁcient num-
ber of predecessors bought the same asset.
In the experiment, we introduce explicit wage setting by
principals (as opposed to simply paying investors a wage
equal to their conditional expected productivity) because
whether reputational herding indeed emerges might, in
principle, depend on two factors: namely, on whether
investors recognize reputational incentives and whether an
outside labormarket indeed provides such incentives.
Main insights
The experimental results show that, as suggested by Das-
gupta and Prat [2008], herd behavior can be observed in
treatment reputation. About half of the investors engage
in herding in the situations where it is predicted by the-
ory. Again, as suggested by theory, in all other situations
almost all subjects trade sincerely. However, surprisingly,
even in treatment investment, herd behavior occurs to a
similar extent. Hence, a substantial fraction of investors
seems to follow an established trend even in the absence
of reputational incentives, and reputational concerns do
not seem to affect behavior much.
The ﬁndings of the experiment contribute to our under-
standing of to which degree reputational herding affects
ﬁnancial markets. Onemechanism of how reputational con-
cerns might inﬂuence investment behavior has been
suggested by Dasgupta and Prat [2008]. Our results suggest
that this mechanism is not at work in ﬁnancial markets and,
hence, does not distort asset prices. Thereby, our results
complement empirical studies on ﬁnancial markets (to be
discussed below), which also document only limited evi-
dence for reputational herding.5 If the widespread presump-
tion that herd behavior is present in ﬁnancial markets is
true, such herd behavior might lead to substantial mispric-
ing of assets and misallocation of capital. Our results hint
that such herd behavior is not driven by reputational con-
cerns, but other (behavioral) forces might be at work (as
suggested by the imitation we observe in the experiment).
To better understand these forces, more research is war-
ranted. Understanding the exact reasons for herd behavior
is important in order to potentially come up with ways of
how to reduce this source ofmispricing in ﬁnancial markets.
Outline
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The
related literature is discussed in the second section. In
the third section, we introduce Dasgupta and Prat’s
[2008] model and present the theoretical benchmarks. In
the fourth section, we outline the experimental design.
The experiment’s results are discussed in the ﬁfth section
followed by concluding remarks in the sixth section. In
addition, we provide details with respect to the deriva-
tion of the theoretical benchmarks (Appendix A), an
English translation of the experimental instructions
(Appendix B), and an example of how individual payoffs
were calculated in the experiment (Appendix C).
Related literature
The present paper contributes to three strands of the
literature.
Empirical literature on herd behavior in ﬁnancial
markets
There is a substantial empirical literature on herd behavior
in ﬁnancial markets (for surveys, see, e.g., Bikhchandani and
Sharma [2000], Daniel, Hirshleifer and Teoh [2002], or
Hirshleifer and Teoh [2003]). This literature has two aims:
to verify whether there is herding in ﬁnancial markets, and,
if yes, to investigate the reasons for herd behavior. In partic-
ular, various authors have investigated whether, due to
career concerns, there is reputational herding by investment
newsletters (see, e.g., Graham [1999]), macroeconomic fore-
casters (see, e.g., Lamont [2002], Ehrbeck and Waldmann
[1996]), security analysts (see, e.g., Hong and Kubik [2003],
Hong, Kubik and Solomon [2000], Welch [2000]), mutual
fund managers (see, e.g., Massa and Patgiri [2007],
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Chevalier and Ellison [1999]), or institutional investors (see,
e.g., Sias [2004]). In summary, these papers only provide
mixed evidence for the presence of reputational herding in
ﬁnancial markets. For example, Sias [2004] and Ehrbeck
and Waldmann [1996] fail to ﬁnd evidence for reputation-
driven herd behavior. Welch [2000] argues that the
observed clustering of behavior could be due to either social
learning or due to reputational concerns of investors.
This empirical literature has, however, a potential
shortcoming. Frequently, neither the private information
on which ﬁnancial market participants act nor the per-
formance incentives or reputational incentives they face
are observable to the econometrician. Consequently,
Hirshleifer and Teoh [2003] argue that, for an empirical
study, it will always be difﬁcult to disentangle to which
degree reputational concerns, social learning, or simple
imitation contribute to herd behavior in ﬁnancial mar-
kets. Hence, we make the following contributions to this
literature. From a methodological perspective, by con-
ducting an experiment, we are able to control for the pri-
vate information and monetary incentives faced by the
decision makers, thereby circumventing the problems of
empirical studies to observe these key variables.6 Our
results complement and conﬁrm the mixed ﬁndings of
the empirical literature: we document that also under the
controlled conditions of a laboratory experiment herding
due to reputational reasons seems to be rather weak. Our
experiment also shows that other (behavioral) forces
seem to lead ﬁnancial market participants to follow
established trends, thereby emphasizing the need to
study behavioral explanations for herd behavior in ﬁnan-
cial markets.
Experimental literature on herd behavior in ﬁnancial
markets
There is also a recent experimental literature on herd
behavior in ﬁnancial markets. These papers have not
studied reputational herding, but they have mainly
focused on settings where herding might be caused by
“social learning” (i.e., where any herding is “purely infor-
mation-based”). That is, they consider settings where the
decisions of early investors might potentially reveal so
much information about an asset’s value such that, for
later investors, it becomes optimal to disregard their own
private information and to follow an established herd
instead.7 These studies document that, under certain
conditions, social learning indeed leads experimental
subjects to engage in herd behavior, thereby lending sup-
port to social learning as a source of herding in ﬁnancial
markets. For example, Park and Sgroi [2010] lend sup-
port to Park and Sabourian [2011], whose model predicts
that there might be information-based herding in
settings that are sufﬁciently complex (i.e., where there
are more than two possible states of the world).8 We con-
tribute to this experimental literature by studying to
which degree reputational concerns lead to herd behav-
ior. In contrast to this literature, from a theoretical per-
spective, social learning does not play a role in the
settings we consider. Our results provide experimental
evidence that reputational forces might be of minor
importance for the emergence of herd behavior in ﬁnan-
cial markets. Instead, we ﬁnd that investors tend to fol-
low an established trend even when there are no
reputational incentives. Such simple imitation has rarely
been observed in the earlier experiments; highlighting
that it might be of greater importance than previously
thought.
Experimental literature on career concerns
Our paper is also related to the experimental literature
on career concerns. This literature has mostly focused on
reputational concerns in labor markets. For example,
Koch, Morgenstern and Raab [2009] experimentally test
Holmstrom’s [1999] seminal career concerns model. In
this model, through providing effort, an agent tries to
inﬂuence the beliefs of potential employers about their
unknown ability, which has an impact on their future
wages. Koch, Morgenstern and Raab [2009] ﬁnd that, in
line with the theoretical prediction, reputational con-
cerns indeed shape the agent’s behavior.9 We contribute
to this literature by studying career concerns not in a
labor market context, but in a ﬁnancial market. In this
setting, we ﬁnd only weak evidence for the impact of rep-
utational concerns.
Theoretical benchmark
Basic structure
We consider a simpliﬁed version of Dasgupta and Prat
[2008] to make it suitable for a laboratory experiment.
The sequence of events is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2.
There are four dates t 2 {1,2,3,4} and three risk-neutral,
proﬁt-maximizing investors i 2 {1,2,3}.10 Investors have
to decide sequentially which of two assets, A or B, to buy,
and at date t D i it is investor i’s turn to buy either one
unit of Asset A or one unit of Asset B.11
Only one of the assets will turn out to have a value of
10 points (our experimental currency) at date t D 4,
while the other asset will have a value of 0 points. Both
states v 2 {A,B} (i.e., which asset has a value of 10 points)
occur with equal probability, and this is known to invest-
ors. The state of the world is the same for all three invest-
ors. As additional information, each investor receives a
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private signal si 2 {a,b}. The signal’s precision depends
on the respective investor’s type, where each investor has
an equal probability of being either “good” or “bad.” In
the case of a good investor, we have sg D Prob(si D ajv
D A) D Prob(si D bjv D B) D 0.9, while in the case of a
bad investor we have sb D Prob(si D ajv D A) D Prob(si
D bjv D B) D 0.5. For each investor, the signal is drawn
independently conditional on the state and the investor’s
type. That is, while a good investor receives additional
information by observing the signal, a bad investor’s sig-
nal is uninformative. Denote the asset bought by investor
i by V i 2 {A,B}.12 The state of the world as well as the
investors’ types are determined at the beginning of the
game. Investors do not learn their type throughout the
game, and the state of the world (and, hence, investors’
payoffs) is only revealed after all investment decisions
have been made.13 When making their investment deci-
sion, each investor can rely on three pieces of informa-
tion: (a) their privately observed signal, (b) the current
market prices for Assets A and B, and (c) the investment
decisions of earlier investors (if there are any) as well as
the history of market prices these earlier investors have
faced. How market prices for the assets are determined is
explained in more detail below.
No reputational concerns of investors
In a ﬁrst step, we consider a benchmark setting where the
investors do not have reputational concerns because they
only derive a proﬁt from buying one of the assets. Market
prices are set by a risk-neutral, competitive market
maker who efﬁciently incorporates all publicly available
information, that is, the history of trades as well as the
investor’s decision to buy the respective asset. Hence, the
market price of Asset A at time t is given by
ptAD 10 ¢Prob A jHt; buy Að Þ; (1)
and the price of Asset B is equal to ptB D 10 ¢ Prob(BjHt,
buy B), where Ht denotes the history of observable deci-
sions of all earlier investors up to time t. Other experi-
ments (such as Drehmann, Oechssler and Roider [2005],
Cipriani and Guarino [2005]) have assumed that the
market maker does not condition the prices ptA and p
t
B
on the kind of order he or she receives at time t (and,
hence, is not fully proﬁt-maximizing). We deviate from
this and assume the price-setting rule (1) because it facil-
itates more “extreme” prices earlier on in a given
sequence of investors.14 In the current benchmark
Figure 1. Sequence of Events without Reputational Concerns.
Figure 2. Sequence of Events with Reputational Concerns.
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setting, the overall payoff of investor i is given by
piI V
i; ptVi ; v
   10¡ ptVi if ViD v¡ ptVi if Vi 6¼ v

(2)
for i D t 2 {1,2,3} (because investor i buys at time t D i
only).
In line with earlier results by Glosten and Milgrom
[1985] and Avery and Zemsky [1998], if investors are only
motivated by proﬁts from trading, all trading will be sincere
(i.e., all investors will act according to their signal). Hence,
investors reveal their private signal through their investment
decision to the market maker. To see this, suppose that the
market maker believes that trading has been sincere and
suppose that investor i has received signal si D a. In this
case, the price of A will equal the investor’s expected value
of A, and hence buying A yields the investor an expected
proﬁt of zero. However, buying Bwould yield a loss because
the market maker would assume that the investor had
received signal b and would set a price that exceeds the
investor’s expected value of B. Consequently, it is optimal
for the investor to trade sincerely, that is, to buy Asset A
(recall that investors do not have the option not to trade).
Likewise, after a signal si D b only an investment in asset
V iD B is optimal. To summarize:
Proposition 1 (Dasgupta and Prat [2008], section 3). In
the absence of reputational concerns, investors always fol-
low their signal and trade sincerely, that is, V i D A if si D a
and V iD B if siD b for all i. Prices are as in Table 1.
Investors with reputational concerns
We now augment the model as outlined in the sections
Basic Structure and No Reputational Concerns of Invest-
ors by reputational concerns of investors. More precisely,
in addition to the payoff from buying a certain asset, at
date t D 4 each investor i receives some wage ri that is
determined at the end of the game, that is,
piR  piI C ri: (3)
Dasgupta and Prat [2008] consider the case that
investors are fund managers and that the wage ri is given
by an outside market’s posterior belief that investor i is a
good type (i.e., an investor whose signal has informa-
tional content). The outside market (i.e., potential future
employers) observes the entire history H4 of trades and
prices as well as the realized true state of the world v (i.e.,
which of the two assets is successful). Consequently, in
contrast to the section No Reputational Concerns of
Investors, investors have an incentive to be perceived as
a good type. It will turn out that, for Investor 3, it is opti-
mal to disregard his private signal and to herd whenever
both predecessors have bought the same asset.
The intuition is as follows: If early investors follow their
signal, the price incorporates their private information and
moves towards the true liquidation value. Over time, how-
ever, price movements become smaller. In particular, proﬁts
from trading according to one’s signal stay zero, while prof-
its from trading against one’s signal stay negative, but
decrease in absolute terms. At the same time, a trader who
observes a signal contrarian to earlier price movements
(and, hence, contrarian to the most likely outcome of the
asset) faces endogenous reputational costs: if they would fol-
low their signal, with a high probability the asset they buy
would turn out to be worthless and they would be perceived
as a bad investor who had received an uninformative signal.
Thus, as prices become sufﬁciently precise (and differential
proﬁts from trading A respectively B sufﬁciently small),
investors start to follow predecessors out of reputational
concerns.
Wage setting process by principals. In practice, whether
reputational herding indeed emerges depends not only
on the behavior of investors, but potentially also on the
wage-setting behavior by the outside market. Conse-
quently, while Dasgupta and Prat [2008] assume that an
investor’s wage is equal to their conditional expected
productivity, we consider an explicit wage setting process
(which yields the same theoretical prediction). In partic-
ular, investor i’s wage is determined in a sealed-bid, ﬁrst-
price auction among six risk-neutral, proﬁt-maximizing
“principals,” where investor i’s wage ri is determined by
the highest bid. The sequence of events is identical to the
section Basic Structure up to date t D 3. As can be
observed in Figure 2, it only differs from t D 4 onward.
Principals can observe the entire history of trades and
prices as well as the realized true state of the world v.
The winning principal has to pay his bid and additionally
gets 20 points if and only if investor i happens to be good
(otherwise he gets no additional points).15 The remain-
ing ﬁve principals get a payoff of zero each.
If, at date 4, principals hold a common belief g that
investor i is of good type, the principals’ bidding strate-
gies in the symmetric equilibrium of the ﬁrst-price auc-
tion are 20 ¢ g (i.e., bids are equal to the respective
Table 1. Market prices for assets A and B.
t Ht ptA p
t
B
1 — 7.0 7.0
2 A 8.4 5.0
2 B 5.0 8.4
3 AB or BA 7.0 7.0
3 AA 9.3 3.0
3 BB 3.0 9.3
Note: Like in the experiment, prices have been rounded to the ﬁrst decimal.
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investor’s “expected value”).16 Hence, in analogy to Das-
gupta and Prat [2008], in equilibrium the respective
investor i receives a reputational payoff of ri D 20 ¢ g.17
Dasgupta and Prat [2008] show that the belief g that
principals hold about a given investor only depends on
this investor’s equilibrium strategy and the realized true
state of the world (but not on the behavior of other
investors). Intuitively, this is the case because principals
can observe which of the assets turns out to be successful,
and investors’ signals are mutually independent given the
true state of the world v (see Dasgupta and Prat [2008],
Proof of Proposition 1). Consequently, (with one excep-
tion to be discussed below) equilibrium wage bids take
on two values only:18 They are equal to 12.86 if the
respective investor chose the successful asset, and they
are equal to 3.33 if the respective investor chose the
unsuccessful asset. The exception are the wage bids for
an Investor 3 who has invested in the same asset as both
of his or her predecessors (i.e., if H4 2 {AAA,BBB}). Such
an investor engages in reputational herding, and hence
their behavior is uninformative. As, from an ex ante per-
spective, both types of the investor are equally likely,
such an Investor 3 receives a wage offer of 0.5 ¢ 20 D 10.
Market prices set by the market maker. The possibility of
herding raises an issue with respect to price setting by the
market maker in the experiment. From a theoretical per-
spective, it will turn out that, even in the presence of reputa-
tional concerns, both Investor 1 and 2 trade sincerely in
equilibrium. Consequently, for them, a proﬁt-maximizing
market maker will set asset prices as spelled out in Table 1.
However, for the case of Investor 3, the market maker will
suspect herd behavior if H3 2 {AA,BB}, and, in this case, a
proﬁt-maximizing market maker would confront Investor 3
with market prices that deviate from Table 1. In the experi-
ment, market prices that differ across treatments would,
however, be problematic as earlier studies have shown that
price levels per se inﬂuence subjects’ inclination to follow
their own signal (see, e.g., Cipriani and Guarino [2005],
Drehmann, Oechssler and Roider [2005]). In particular,
there is evidence for contrarian behavior, where subjects are
more likely to act against their signal, if prices are higher.
This price effect would make it difﬁcult to compare our
treatments with and without reputational concerns. To rule
out this confounding effect, we assume that even if investors’
payoffs are given by Equation 3, the market maker sets mar-
ket prices according to Table 1.19 In Appendix A, we illus-
trate that theoretical predictions with respect to the
behavior of investors and principals remain unaffected by
this assumption.20 As a theoretical benchmark in the pres-
ence of reputational concerns, we focus on Dasgupta and
Prat’s [2008] “most revealing equilibrium,” in which
investors maximally condition their trades on their private
information (see Dasgupta and Prat [2008], Section 4.1):21
Proposition 2 (Dasgupta and Prat [2008], proposition
4). Assume that market prices are as in Table 1 and that
investors have reputational concerns. Then, in the most
revealing equilibrium, Investors 1 and 2 trade sincerely.
Investor 3 trades sincerely unless both of his or her prede-
cessors have invested in the same asset, in which case he or
she herds. The (symmetric) wage bids submitted by the
principals for investor i are equal to (a) 10 if iD 3 and H4 2
{AAA,BBB}, and (b) otherwise they are equal to 12.86 (3.33)
if investor i has bought the successful (unsuccessful) asset.
Experimental design
Recruitment and subject pool
The experiment was conducted in ﬁve sessions, which
ran in May and June 2011 in the AWI Lab at the Univer-
sity of Heidelberg. Participants were recruited randomly
via Orsee (Greiner [2004]) from AWI Lab’s subject pool
of persons who had indicated their interest in participat-
ing in economic experiments. In total, 90 subjects partic-
ipated; 18 in each session. None of the subjects had
participated in experiments on either herd behavior or
reputational effects before. Each session lasted approxi-
mately 120 minutes. Participants earned 13.95 Euro on
average. Altogether, 44 women (48.89%) and 46 men
participated. The average age was 21.68 years, and the
average number of semesters studied 3.75. Of the partici-
pants, 35.6% were economics majors while the second-
largest group consisted of law students (12.22%). The
entire experiment was paper-and-pencil based.
Implementation
Upon entering the laboratory, all 18 participants of a given
session were informed that investment decisions in two
completely independent rounds had to be taken. A transla-
tion of the experimental instructions can be found in
Appendix B.
In the ﬁrst round, subjects played a treatment investment,
and in the second round they played a treatment
reputation. The (benchmark) treatment investment corre-
sponds to the setting without reputational concerns
described in the section No Reputational Concerns of
Investors. That is, all subjects acted as investors, their payoff
function was given by Equation 2, and this was common
knowledge among participants. Treatment reputation corre-
sponds to the setting with reputational concerns of investors
described in the section Investors with Reputational Con-
cerns. Subjects learned about the details of treatment
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reputation only after they had completed the ﬁrst round. In
each session of treatment reputation, 6 randomly selected
subjects acted as principals while the remaining 12 subjects
acted as investors. Investors’ payoff functions were given by
Equation 3, principals made wage offers for investors as
described in the section Investors with Reputational Con-
cerns, and again this was common knowledge among par-
ticipants. In order to ensure that both investors and
principals were informed about the entire (information)
structure of the game, all subjects received identical instruc-
tions. To achieve comparability, investors received identical
decision sheets in both rounds of the experiment.22 As dis-
cussed in the sections No Reputational Concerns of Invest-
ors and Investors with Reputational Concerns, in both
treatments market prices for the two assets were set accord-
ing to Table 1.23
Both rounds of a session had the same basic structure.
First, the instructions for the respective round were
handed to subjects and read out aloud by the experi-
menter. Afterward, the experimenter additionally
explained the main features of the respective round via a
ﬂip chart to subjects. Subsequently, to check whether the
experimental setup was clear, a questionnaire regarding
details of the setup had to be answered. Only after all
subjects had ﬁlled out the questionnaire correctly were
decision sheets distributed and ﬁlled out by the subjects.
After this, the respective round ended.
Only after the second round, subjects learned their pay-
offs. They also answered a postexperimental questionnaire,
where we requested demographic information, asked ques-
tions about the experiment, and elicited subjects’ degree of
risk aversion. Finally, payments were privately handed out
to subjects, after which the experiment ended.
Strategy method to elicit subjects’ decisions
To elicit subjects’ decisions, the strategy method was used.
This design choice (together with the choice to consider
sequences of three investors) was driven by the following
considerations. As discussed in the section Investors with
Reputational Concerns, in the presence of reputational con-
cerns theory suggests sincere trading by Investors 1 and 2,
and it suggests herding by Investor 3 only if both of his or
her predecessors have bought the same asset. Hence, if we
would not have employed the strategy method, only the
decisions of subjects who (a) act as Investor 3 and (b) face a
history of earlier decisions H3 2 {AA,BB} would have been
informative with respect to the presence of reputational
herding. In order to economize on the size of the subject
pool, we therefore have used the strategymethod. Given this
design choice, we restrict attention to sequences of three
investors in order to limit the number of decisions each sub-
ject has tomake.
Translations of the decision sheets that investors and
principals had to ﬁll out can be found in Appendix B.
When acting as an investor, the respective subject was
asked to state decisions V i for all i 2 {1,2,3}, for all possi-
ble histories of prices and predecessors’ decisions, and all
possible own signal realizations he or she might observe.
That is, the respective subject was asked to state a deci-
sion for every information set at which an investor might
have to make a decision. For example, when acting as an
investor the subject was asked to imagine that they were
Investor 1 and to state their decision for both the cases
that they receive the signal s1 D a and s1 D b. Likewise,
the subject was asked to imagine they were Investor 2
and to state their (in total, 4) decisions depending on
whether their predecessor had chosen A or B and
depending on whether their own signal was a or b. In a
similar vein, as Investor 3 they had to state 8 decisions.
Subjects who acted as principals in treatment reputation
were asked to submit a bid for each investor i 2 {1,2,3}
for each possible history of decisions and prices the
respective investor might have observed, and for each
possible realization of the state of the world.24
Payments
Subjects received a showup fee of 4 Euro about which
they were informed at the beginning of the experiment.
Subjects were furthermore told that, depending on their
success in the experiment, they could earn additional
money, where each additional point (our experimental
currency) paid out 0.20 Euro. In each of the two rounds,
each subject (investors in treatment investment, and
investors and principals in treatment reputation)
received an initial endowment of 20 points. Except for
the showup fee, the exact amount earned was revealed at
the end of the experiment only (and subjects were aware
of this).
As we employed the strategy method, in each of the two
rounds each subject’s payoff depended on one randomly
chosen decision, and we took care to explain in detail to sub-
jects how individual payoffs were calculated. In the follow-
ing, we describe how individual payoffs were calculated and,
in Appendix C, we provide an example. In particular, at the
end of the experiment and independently for each of the
two rounds, payments were determined as follows: By mak-
ing draws from urns, (a) we randomly allocated investors
into groups of three subjects and randomly assigned the
roles of Investor 1, 2, and 3, and (b) according to the proba-
bilities described above, for each of the investor groups, we
randomly determined the successful asset and each invest-
or’s type and signal.25 Given this information, for each of
the investor groups, we are then able to obtain the decision
of Investor 1 from the respective subject’s decision sheet and
250 A. ROIDER AND A. VOSKORT
to calculate their payoff from their investment decision (see
Equation 2 above). In a second and third step, we then
obtain the decisions (and calculate the payoffs) of Investors
2 and 3 in an analogous way (given the decisions of Investor
1, and of Investors 1 and 2, respectively). This concludes the
determination of payoffs in treatment investment.
In treatment reputation, the above procedure left us
with a decision history and a successful asset for each of
the four investor groups in a given session of this treat-
ment. By looking at the decision sheets of principals, we
were hence able to determine the highest bid for each
investor (i.e., their wage). Given the respective investor’s
type, we were also able to determine the principals’ pay-
offs from the auction for the respective investor: only the
winning principal had to pay the bid and, if the investor
was a good type, the winning principal earned 20 points.
All other principals earned 0 from the respective
auction.26
Results
In this section, the results of the experiment are presented.
In the ﬁrst subsection, we discuss the evidence for reputa-
tional herding by comparing treatments reputation and
investment. The second subsection documents substantial
imitative behavior among investors that cannot be
explained by Dasgupta and Prat’s [2008] model. Finally,
in the third subsection, we compare the actual wage set-
ting by principals with various benchmarks, and we study
the incentives for reputational herding the actual wage
setting creates.
Evidence on reputational herding
For both treatment investment and reputation, Table 2
depicts the fraction of subjects that behave in line with
the theoretical prediction at a given information set of
the game (where an information set is characterized by
the predecessors’ choices and the own signal). Note that
we pool information sets that differ in labeling only, and
hence are symmetric. For example, in Table 2 AAb and
BBa are both subsumed under XXy.27 More formally, in
the following we describe information sets by combina-
tions of capital letters and small letters where capital let-
ters refer to the observed decisions of predecessors (i.e.,
X,Y 2 {A,B}, where X 6¼ Y) and small letters indicate the
own signal (i.e.,. x,y 2 {a,b}, where x D a if X D A, x D b
if X D B, y D a if X D B, and y D b if X D A).
A ﬁrst inspection of Table 2 reveals that at all infor-
mation sets except XXy behavior is remarkably close to
the theoretical prediction of subjects following their own
signal independent of the investment decisions of prede-
cessors. Indeed, in treatment investment (treatment repu-
tation) 86.39% (89.44%) of decisions are in line with
theory if one averages over all information sets except
XXy.28 In treatment reputation, Dasgupta and Prat
[2008] predict that Investor 3 herds at information set
XXy (i.e., if the decisions of both of his or her predeces-
sors conform). And, indeed, Table 2 shows that 41.67%
of subjects disregard their own signal and follow the lead
of predecessors’ decisions instead. Two observations
with respect to behavior at information set XXy are,
however, surprising. First, even in treatment reputation,
a majority of subjects still follows its own signal. Second,
even in treatment investment (where, according to Das-
gupta and Prat [2008], acting against one’s signal is never
optimal) a substantial fraction of subjects disregards its
private information. It turns out that, both in treatment
reputation and in treatment investment, behavior differs
signiﬁcantly at information set XXy compared to all
other information sets (at the 1% level).29
Table 3 investigates behavior at information set XXy
in more detail. There, we restrict attention to the 60 sub-
jects that serve as investors in both treatments. As Table 3
indicates, a substantial number of subjects either follow
their own signal in both treatments (i.e., in both treat-
ments choose Y) or follow the lead of their predecessors
in both treatments (i.e., always choose X, which, accord-
ing to Table 3, holds for 43 subjects). At information set
AAb (BBa) only 4 (3) out of 60 subjects act in line with
Table 2. Fraction of investors behaving in line with the theoreti-
cal prediction.
Treatment
Investor Information Set Investment (%) Reputation (%)
1 x 91.66 95.83
2 Xx 85.00 89.17
2 Xy 79.45 80.00
3 XXx 81.11 86.67
3 XXy 56.33 41.67
3 XYy 86.67 90.00
3 XYx 94.45 95.00
Note: N D 90 (N D 60) in treatment investment (reputation). With respect to
the information available to subjects, capital letters refer to the observed
decisions of predecessors (i.e., X,Y2{A,B}, where X6¼Y), and small letters
indicate the own signal (i.e., x,y2{a,b}, where x D a if X D A, x D b if X D B,
y D a if X D B, and y D b if X D A).
Table 3. Number of investors choosing asset X respectively Y at
information set XXy.
Reputation
X Y Sum
Investment X 43 14 57
Y 7 56 63
Sum 50 70 120
Note: N D 60 in both treatments (i.e., all subjects except those who acted as
principals in treatment reputation).
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theory in both treatments. Behavior at XXy does not dif-
fer signiﬁcantly between treatments according to a
McNemar change test.30
To summarize, it is indeed in the situations predicted
by Dasgupta and Prat [2008] that a substantial fraction
of subjects disregards its own information in treatment
reputation (and, hence, follows an established trend).
However, it is surprising that a similar fraction of invest-
ors engages in the same behavior in treatment invest-
ment, where reputational incentives are absent. This
ﬁnding is studied in more detail in the next subsection.31
Evidence on imitative behavior by investors
The ﬁnding that even in treatment investment a substan-
tial fraction of subjects (nearly half) disregards its own
signal at information set XXy is indicative of imitative
behavior on the part of investors, which cannot be
explained by Dasgupta and Prat [2008]. If such imitative
behavior is indeed prevalent and has been anticipated by
principals, it might have affected principals’ wage offers.
In turn, this might have affected the reputational incen-
tives faced by investors. This might potentially help to
explain the apparent lack of reputational herding in
treatment reputation.
Consequently, in a next step, we provide evidence on
imitative behavior among investors. To do so, we ﬁrst
look at the behavior of Investor 2, who, independent of
the treatment, should always follow their own signal.
However, as Table 2 indicates, Investor 2 is less likely to
trust their private information at information set Xy
than at information set Xx (in treatment investment:
79.45% vs. 85.00%, and in treatment reputation: 80.00%
vs. 89.17%). That is, if the predecessor’s decision contra-
dicts their own private information, some investors seem
to imitate their predecessor.32 That there is indeed signif-
icant imitative behavior among subjects is conﬁrmed by
a regression analysis. In Table 4, we report on a probit
estimation where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if
A is chosen and equal to 0 if B is chosen. As an explana-
tory variable, we include signal, which is an indicator
variable that is equal to 1 if the signal observed by the
respective investor is a, and that is equal to 0 if the signal
observed by the respective investor is b. If there were no
imitation, only the variable signal would affect investors’
behavior. One way to measure the potential inﬂuence of
predecessors’ actions is the explanatory variable history
(which is not deﬁned for Investor 1 who does not have
predecessors).33 In the case of Investor 2, history is equal
to 1 (¡1) if the respective predecessor has chosen A (B).
In the case of Investor 2, history is equal to 2 (¡2) if
both predecessors have chosen A (B), and it is 0 if the
predecessors’ actions do not agree. Alternatively, we
study the explanatory variable decision1 (decision2),
which is an indicator that is equal to 1 if investor 10s
(investor 20s) decision is A, and that is equal to 0 if the
respective investor’s decision is B.
In the regression analysis, we restrict attention to
treatment investment because there, from a theoretical
perspective, subjects should always follow their own sig-
nal. In column 1 of Table 4, we regress the decision of
Investor 1 on his signal. Columns 2 and 3 repeat the
same exercise for Investors 2 and 3, respectively. In these
regressions, we ﬁnd a highly signiﬁcant effect of the own
private information (where standard errors are clustered
at the subject level). Nevertheless, coefﬁcients seem to be
declining in the position of the investor, which might be
indicative of the fact that subjects are also affected by fac-
tors other than their own signal. In column 4, we pool
observations from Investors 2 and 3 (who potentially
might engage in imitative behavior). There, we again
ﬁnd a highly signiﬁcant effect of the own signal. How-
ever, history also has a highly signiﬁcant effect that dem-
onstrates that, contrary to what theory would predict,
these investors tend to imitate their predecessors. In col-
umn 5, we investigate whether Investor 1 or Investor 2
has a stronger inﬂuence on Investor 30s behavior. In this
regression, we ﬁnd a highly signiﬁcant inﬂuence of
Investor 1 and a marginally signiﬁcant inﬂuence of
Investor 2. Thus, Investor 3 seems to be more inclined to
follow earlier rather than later decisions.34
Taken together, the ﬁndings of Table 4 provide strong
evidence for imitation that cannot be explained by Dasgupta
and Prat’s [2008] model of reputational herding. This ﬁnd-
ing is interesting in the light of the earlier experimental liter-
ature on herding in ﬁnancial markets. For example, various
experiments studying informational cascades in markets
with ﬂexible prices ﬁnd that imitation seems to occur only
Table 4. Evidence on imitative behavior in treatment investment.
1 2 3 4 5
signal 0.833 0.644 0.592 0.623 0.614
(0.040) (0.044) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033)
history 0.077
(0.025)
decision1 0.229
(0.058)
decision2 0.109
(0.057)
Observations 180 360 720 1080 720
Log-likelihood ¡50.71 ¡168.44 ¡364.41 ¡516.56 ¡346.02
Pseudo-R2 0.5927 0.3249 0.2698 0.3100 0.3067
Note: Probit estimates, where all regressions include a constant and where
coefﬁcients represent marginal effects. The regression analyzes behavior of
investors in treatment investment (N D 90). Robust standard errors (clus-
tered at the subject-level) are shown in parentheses. ,, and  indicate
signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Columns 1, 2, and 3
consider behavior of Investor 1, Investor 2, and Investor 3, respectively. Col-
umn 4 pools observations from Investors 2 and 3, and column 5 considers
Investor 3 only.
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rarely (see, e.g., Cipriani and Guarino [2005], Drehmann,
Oechssler and Roider [2005]).35
Wage setting by principals
Having documented imitative behavior on the part of
investors, we now turn to the wage setting of principals.
Was their wage setting in line with theory? Did princi-
pals correctly anticipate the actual behavior of investors
in the experiment? And if yes, did the principals’ wage-
setting behavior lead to reduced incentives for reputa-
tional herding in treatment reputation?
Two benchmarks: equilibrium wages and behavioral
wages. To evaluate the actual wage setting by principals in
the experiment, we calculate two benchmark wages. The
ﬁrst benchmark is the equilibrium wages req that are pre-
dicted by theory (see Proposition 2). As a second bench-
mark, we calculate behavioral wages rbeh that would
optimally have been set by proﬁt-maximizing principals if
they had correctly anticipated the actual behavior of invest-
ors in the experiment. In order to calculate the behavioral
wages rbeh, we proceed as follows. First, from the actual fre-
quencies with which the two types of Investors 1, 2, and 3
follow their own signal in treatment reputation, we calculate
the empirical frequencies of facing a good investor (given a
certain combination of history of trades and realized value
of the asset). Multiplying these empirical frequencies with
the good investor’s value of 20 points, we arrive at the behav-
ioral wages rbeh.
Wage setting by principals relative to the benchmarks.
In a ﬁrst step, we consider the wages offered to Investors 1
and 2. From a theoretical perspective, these investors always
trade sincerely, and the equilibrium wage req they receive
depends on the success respectively failure of the investment
only (see Proposition 2). As illustrated in Table 5, on aver-
age, behavioral wages offered to these investors would be
less extreme than equilibrium wages. That is, behavioral
wages would be lower (higher) than equilibrium wages
when the asset is successful (unsuccessful). Given that the
partially imitative behavior of investors makes it more difﬁ-
cult to gauge the investor’s type from the outcome of the
game, it does not seem surprising that behavioral wages
would be closer to 10 (which would be the optimal wage
offer if one would not have any additional information
except for the prior probability of facing a good type). In
order to evaluate actual wage setting, in Table 5, we report
rall (which is the average wage offer when considering all
principals) and rmax (where we only consider the maximum
wages, i.e., the wages offered by winning principals). As
Table 5 documents, on average, rall is somewhat lower than
the benchmarks req and rbeh, while rmax overshoots both
benchmarks. However, in line with the benchmark wages,
rall and rmax are signiﬁcantly higher in case of success than
in case of failure of the investment (according to Wilcoxon
signed ranks tests at the 1% level and 5% level,
respectively).36
In a second step, we consider wages offered to Inves-
tor 3, which are displayed in Table 6. When theory pre-
dicts herding, req is equal to 10 (because in this case the
investor’s decision is uninformative about his type). Oth-
erwise, equilibrium wages only vary in the success or fail-
ure of the investment. In line with both benchmark
wages, principals seem to consider the history of trades
XXX as less informative of the respective investor’s type
than other histories of trade (because at histories of trade
other than XXX wages are further away from 10).37 An
interesting observation with respect to behavioral wages
emerges if the history of trades is given by XXX. Then,
the equilibrium prediction for the wage is 10 indepen-
dent of the investment’s success. While in case of a suc-
cessful investment the behavioral wage rbeh is almost
identical to this prediction, in case of an unsuccessful
investment rbeh is considerably lower. Hence, in contrast
to what is predicted by theory, even in these situations
the failure of the investment seems to be predictive of
the investor’s type. More importantly, across the various
settings considered in Table 6, for both rall and rmax the
relative ordering of the wages is identical to the relative
ordering of rbeh: Investor 3 fetches the lowest (highest)
wage when the history of trade is not XXX and when
their investment is unsuccessful (successful). As in the
case of the wages offered to Investors 1 and 2, the wages
rall (rmax) that are offered to Investor 3 somewhat under-
shoot (overshoot) the benchmark wage rbeh. Neverthe-
less, principals’ actual wage-setting behavior comes
relatively close to the benchmark rbeh.
Are there different behavioral types among the princi-
pals? One might suspect that principals who themselves
are prone to imitative behavior might set wages differ-
ently from other principals. We investigate this issue by
Table 5. Average wages offered to investors 1 and 2.
Purchased Asset is req rbeh rall rmax
Unsuccessful 3.33 4.27 2.17 6.79
Successful 12.86 11.83 10.34 16.15
Table 6. Average wages offered to investor 3.
Purchased Asset is History of Trades req rbeh rall rmax
Unsuccessful D XXX 10.00 5.83 3.40 10.10
6¼ XXX 3.33 4.69 2.37 6.80
Successful D XXX 10.00 10.01 9.42 16.10
6¼ XXX 12.86 11.30 10.31 16.53
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using data from treatment investment, where the princi-
pals of treatment reputation acted as investors. We label
a principal as an imitator if, in treatment investment,
they bought Asset A at information set AAb and bought
Asset B at information set BBa. This applies to 8 of the
principals. The remaining 22 principals are labeled as
nonimitators. In order to study potential behavioral dif-
ferences between these two types of principals, we focus
on the wages offered to Investor 3. We do this to explore
two issues: First, do different principals react differently
to Investor 3 following his or her predecessors? And, sec-
ond, what role does the ultimate success of Investor 30s
decision play? While, due to large variances, differences
are, in general, not statistically signiﬁcant, some sugges-
tive patterns do emerge nonetheless (see Table 7, which
displays average wages rall).
On average, principals offer higher wages to successful
investors than to unsuccessful investors. With one notable
exception (discussed below), imitators tend to punish failure
somewhat less and reward success somewhat less than noni-
mitators do. That is, imitators seem to offer slightly higher
(lower) wages than nonimitators if the asset is unsuccessful
(successful). This could suggest that imitators perceive suc-
cess (respectively failure) as less informative of the investor’s
type than nonimitators do. The interesting exception to this
emerges if the history of trades is given byXXY: If Investor 3
decides to make an investment that contradicts both of his
or her predecessors, imitators seem to condition their wage
offers on the success or failure of the investment decision
more strongly than nonimitators do. That is, imitators seem
to deem acting against an established trend as more infor-
mative about the respective investor’s type than nonimita-
tors do. Moreover, independent of the success of the
investment, nonimitators reward herding (in the sense that
theymake higher wage offers to Investor 3 given a history of
tradesXXX than given a history of trades XXY: 3.36 vs. 1.80,
and 9.64 vs. 9.27). This is not the case for the imitators
among the principals (where in case of success of the invest-
ment, we have 8.81 vs. 11.94).
Reputational incentives for Investor 3. A key question is
whether the actual wage-setting behavior of the princi-
pals in the experiment generates incentives for Investor 3
to engage in reputational herding. In order to investigate
this issue, we look at each of the information sets that
Investor 3 might face (i.e., XXy, XXx, XYx, and XYy).
For each of these four cases, we derive the difference
between Investor 30s expected payoff when he or she
does not follow their signal and Investor 30s expected
payoff when he or she does follow their signal. We calcu-
late these payoff differences under various assumptions
on what Investor 3 believes about the behavior of Inves-
tor 1, Investor 2, and the principals.
In column 1 of Table 8, we report the payoff differences
predicted by Proposition 2. For this case, column 1 indicates
that Investor 3 should engage in reputational herding at
information set XXy (yielding him or her a payoff that is
1.51 points higher than when trading sincerely). Investor 3
should follow their signal otherwise (as indicated by the neg-
ative payoff differences).38 In columns 2 and 3 of Table 8, we
assume that Investor 3 holds the belief that Investors 1 and 2
always act in line with theory (i.e., always follow their signal).
However, with respect to the wage offers, we assume that
Investor 3 correctly anticipates the actual wage-setting
behavior by principals: rall (column 2) respectively rmax (col-
umn 3). Interestingly, in both columns 2 and 3, reputational
incentives remain intact: an Investor 3 holding such beliefs
should still herd at information setXXy, but not otherwise.
In columns 4 and 5 of Table 8, we assume that Investor 3
not only correctly anticipates actual wage setting by
Table 7. Average wages rall offered to investor 3 by imitators and
nonimitators.
Purchased Asset Is
Unsuccessful Successful
History of Trades Nonimitators Imitators Nonimitators Imitators
XXX 3.36 3.50 9.64 8.81
XXY 1.80 1.38 9.27 11.94
XYY 2.86 3.31 10.18 9.94
XYX 2.25 3.00 11.18 9.81
Note: A principal is labeled an imitator if in treatment investment he or she
bought Asset A at information set AAb and bought Asset B at information
set BBa, which applies to 8 (out of a total of 30) principals. All other princi-
pals are labeled as nonimitators.
Table 8. Differences in expected payoffs of investor 3 from not following respectively following his own signal under various beliefs on
the behavior of investor 1, investor 2, and the principals.
Investor 3 Assumes
Sincere Trading by Investors 1 and 2
Investor 3 Correctly
Anticipates Actual Behavior by Investors 1 and 2
1 2 3 4 5 6
Information Set req rall rmax rall rmax rbeh
XXy 1.51 0.45 0.85 ¡1.89 ¡0.38 ¡2.76
XXx ¡10.50 ¡8.93 ¡11.14 ¡7.14 ¡9.23 ¡3.30
XYx ¡7.81 ¡6.31 ¡6.81 ¡7.59 ¡8.12 ¡6.88
XYy ¡7.81 ¡6.14 ¡6.91 ¡5.68 ¡6.35 ¡4.75
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principals, but that they also correctly anticipate the actual
behavior of Investors 1 and 2 in the experiment. That is, we
assume that Investor 3 anticipates the actual frequencies
with which Investors 1 and 2 do not trade sincerely. In this
case, given a certain history of his or her predecessors’ deci-
sions, Investor 3 draws correct inference about the success
probabilities of the two assets. Columns 4 and 5 of Table 8
reveal that, if Investor 3 held such correct beliefs, reputa-
tional incentives to herd would disappear. This is so because
not following the own signal would always lead to a negative
payoff. In column 6 of Table 8, we investigate whether
incentives for reputational herding would reemerge if Inves-
tor 3 held correct beliefs with respect to the behavior of the
other investors, and if, in addition, he or she expected opti-
mal wage setting by principals (i.e., wage offers rbeh). This is
not the case because not following their own signal would
again always yield a negative payoff.
To summarize, if we assume that Investor 3 anticipates
the actual (partly imitative) behavior of earlier investors,
then themonetary incentives for reputational herding disap-
pear (see columns 4–6 of Table 8). Hence, the apparent lack
of reputational herding seems to be a consequence of the
noisy behavior of early investors who do not always follow
their private signal. If earlier decisions do not reveal the
underlying private information, observing an established
trend is less indicative of the potential success of the invest-
ment. Hence, acting against the trend carries a smaller loss
in reputation than what theory would suggest (because act-
ing against the trend does less strongly suggest that the
respective investor is a bad type). This smaller loss in reputa-
tionmight lead later investors to refrain from herding.
Conclusion
The possibility of herd behavior in ﬁnancial markets has
received considerable attention in both the academic lit-
erature and the popular press. Various explanations have
been put forward why investors might tend to follow
existing trends (e.g., social learning, reputational con-
cern, or simply imitation). Purely information-based
social-learning arguments have been studied extensively
in the theoretical and experimental literature. Reputa-
tional concerns of investors as a potential source of herd-
ing have received relatively less attention. This seems
somewhat surprising given the prominence of reputa-
tion-based explanations among practitioners (see, e.g.,
the epigraph) and given the attention they have received
in the empirical literature.
By now, there is a growing theoretical literature on repu-
tational herding. To our knowledge, the present paper is the
ﬁrst one to implement a theory of reputational herding in
ﬁnancial markets in the laboratory. In particular, we con-
sider the model by Dasgupta and Prat [2008], where
investors might disregard their private information and fol-
low an existing trend because they worry about later wage
offers from an outside job market. Conducting an experi-
ment allows to control for the information that investors
hold and for the incentives that they face. This is, in general,
not possible in an empirical study.
The intuition behind Dasgupta and Prat [2008] is as fol-
lows. They consider a sequential asset market, where invest-
ors receive private information with respect to the prospects
of two assets. The precision of this signal depends on the
investor’s unobservable ability type. Early investors will ﬁnd
it optimal to trade sincerely and, as a consequence, the mar-
ket prices of the assets will move closer toward their true val-
ues. Hence, proﬁts from trading become smaller and
smaller. At the same time, for later investors, acting against
an established trend comes at a cost because it might leave
the outside job market with the impression that the respec-
tive investor is a bad type (who has received a wrong signal).
Hence, the theory predicts that, depending on the history of
earlier trades, later investors might optimally disregard their
private information and engage in reputational herding.
Whether reputational herding indeed emerges depends
on two things. First, whether investors respond to the incen-
tives set by the outside market, and, second, whether the
outside job market indeed sets incentives for reputational
herding. As a consequence, in the experiment, we consider
an explicit wage-setting process where some of the subjects
act as principals andmake wage offers to investors.
In the experiment, we ﬁnd that it is indeed in the situa-
tions predicted by Dasgupta and Prat [2008] that a substan-
tial fraction of investors follows an established trend.
However, this seems to be driven by imitation rather than
by reputational herding: A similar fraction of subjects
engages in such behavior even in a treatment where there is
no outside job market (and where theory would predict sin-
cere trading by all investors). The fact that we document
imitation that is not driven by a proﬁt motive seems to be
interesting because such behavior has hardly been observed
in earlier experiments on herding in ﬁnancial markets.
In the experiment, wages somewhat undershoot the the-
oretical prediction while average winning wages somewhat
overshoot the theoretical prediction. To investigate the rep-
utational incentives investors have faced in the laboratory,
we conduct a thought experiment. If we assume that Inves-
tor 3 anticipates the actual (partly imitative) behavior of ear-
lier investors, then the monetary incentives for reputational
herding disappear. Hence, the apparent lack of reputational
herding might be driven by the rather noisy behavior of
early investors: Because early investors do not always follow
their private signal, observing an established trend is less
indicative of the potential success of the investment. Hence,
acting against the trend carries a smaller loss in reputation
than what theory suggests (because acting against the trend
JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 255
does less strongly imply that the respective investor is a bad
type). This smaller loss in reputationmight lead later invest-
ors to refrain from herding.
This raises the questionwhether, with a longer sequence of
investors than considered in the present experiment, incen-
tives for reputational herding might reemerge. In theory, this
could happen even when early investors’ decisions do not
perfectly reﬂect their private information: If there is a sufﬁ-
ciently long trend in the same direction, this might still pro-
vide sufﬁciently precise information on the true state of the
world. However, sufﬁciently long trends might not emerge.
While the settings are slightly different, experiments on social
learning in ﬁnancial markets (see, e.g., Cipriani and Guarino
[2005], Drehmann, Oechssler and Roider [2005]) have docu-
mented a strong tendency of investors to engage in “contrar-
ian behavior” (i.e., the higher the market price of an asset, the
less likely are investors to buy this asset). As a consequence,
even with a longer sequence of investors, asset prices might
fail to become sufﬁciently extreme for reputational concerns
to outweigh proﬁts from trading according to one’s own
information.
In our experiment, all investors were informed in the
sense that each investor received a signal that contained
some information.39 That is, we abstract from completely
uninformed investors. In the real world, in many stocks
and markets, there will be substantial numbers of unin-
formed traders whose behavior is unlikely to be random.
As a consequence, our present ﬁndings mainly apply to
stocks respectively markets in which uninformed traders
play a limited role. As opposed to heavily traded stocks,
this may particularly hold for stocks that are difﬁcult to
assess or to arbitrage (see, e.g., Blasco and Ferreruela
[2008], Sias [2004], Palomino [1996]). It would be an
interesting relevant topic for future experimental
research to study how the presence of uninformed trad-
ers affects ﬁnancial market outcomes.
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Notes
1. In Avery and Zemsky [1998], this is the case in a setup with
two dimensions of uncertainty and two states of the world.
Traders have private information not only about the assets’
values, but also about whether some event occurs that changes
the value of the asset substantially (“event uncertainty”).
While in Avery and Zemsky [1998] herding does not emerge
if there is one-dimensional uncertainty with respect to the
assets’ values only, Park and Sabourian [2011] show that,
even in this case, there may be herding if there are more than
two states of the world.
2. For other theoretical work on reputational incentives in a
ﬁnancial markets context, see, for example, Villatoro
[2009], Dasgupta and Prat [2006], and Huddart [1999].
3. Investors might, for example, have an intrinsic preference
for conformity.
4. Herd behavior, in our setup, refers to the case in which
investors follow the investment decisions of predecessors
regardless of their own signal. In this case, investors’
behavior thus does not carry informational value and asset
prices do not converge to the true liquidation values.
5. While an experimental approach has its own issues, it has the
advantage of being able to control for decisionmakers’ private
information and monetary incentives (which is, in general,
difﬁcult when working with real ﬁnancial market data).
6. Of course, as mentioned above, experimental studies might
have their own issues such as the external validity of the ﬁnd-
ings. Hence, both approaches complement each other.
7. Beginning with Anderson and Holt [1997], there is a vast
experimental literature on such “information cascades” in
settings with ﬁxed prices. These studies, however, do not
directly apply to ﬁnancial markets where prices are ﬂexi-
ble. For an overview, see, for example, Weizsacker [2010]
or Drehmann, Oechssler and Roider [2007].
8. Note that sufﬁcient complexity of the environment seems to
be necessary for information-based herding to emerge: Dreh-
mann, Oechssler and Roider [2005] and Cipriani and Guar-
ino [2005] conﬁrm Avery and Zemsky’s [1998] prediction of
no herding in a simple ﬁnancial market with one-dimensional
uncertainty over two potential states of the world.
9. See also the experiment by Irlenbusch and Sliwka [2006]where,
however, not only career concerns, but also gift-exchange con-
siderationsmight have affected subjects’ behavior.
10. The reasons for considering sequences of three investors
are discussed in detail in the section Experimental Design.
11. Dasgupta and Prat [2008] consider the choice between
buying or (short) selling a single asset. In line with other
experiments on herding in ﬁnancial markets (see, e.g.,
Drehmann, Oechssler and Roider [2005], Cipriani and
Guarino [2005]) we consider the strategically equivalent
choice between buying either A or B, which seems to be
easier to explain to experimental subjects.
12. In their model, Dasgupta and Prat [2008] assume that a
certain fraction of the investors are noise traders whose
trading is purely random. For two reasons, we do not
include such noise traders. First, this simpliﬁcation does
not affect the theoretical predictions; and, second, it
makes it easier to explain the experimental setting to sub-
jects. Note that despite of this simpliﬁcation, market
breakdown is not an issue as, in the experiment, subjects
have to buy one of the two assets. The issue of uninformed
traders is discussed in more detail in the Conclusion.
13. Note that, in the experiment, investors learn the state and
their payoffs only at the very end of the experiment after
all decisions have been made.
14. In the presence of reputational concerns (see the section
Investors with Reputational Concerns) this will be a useful
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feature because, from a theoretical perspective, “extreme”
prices facilitate reputational herding.
15. In case of a tie, each of the highest bidding principals wins
with equal probability.
16. To see this, note that in any equilibrium the following has
to hold: (a) all bids must be weakly below 20 ¢ g (because
otherwise the winning bid would lead to a loss), (b) the
maximum bid must be equal to 20 ¢ g (because otherwise
a losing bidder would have an incentive to overbid), and
(c) at least two bids must be equal to 20 ¢ g (because other-
wise the winning bidder would have an incentive to lower
his or her bid). Hence, in any equilibrium of the ﬁrst-price
auction at least two principals bid 20 ¢ g while the remain-
ing principals bid weakly less than that.
17. Note that in Dasgupta and Prat [2008], the weight of repu-
tational concerns in an investor’s payoff function is deter-
mined by the parameter (1 - b), where b constitutes the
payoff fraction from investing in the asset. By ﬁxing the
value of the good investor to 20 and the successful asset’s
payoff to 10, (1 - b) equals 2/3 in our setup.
18. For a more detailed sketch of Dasgupta and Prat’s [2008]
argument, see Appendix A.
19. Recall that the role of market maker is played by the
experimenter, and hence potential losses are not an issue.
20. As argued above, for a given investor, principals’ equilib-
rium wage bids only depend on (i) investors’ equilibrium
strategies and (ii) the realized true state of the world. In
Appendix A, we show that, given equilibrium wage bid-
ding strategies of principals, equilibrium investment strat-
egies of investors are the same independent of whether
one sets market prices according to Table 1 or whether
market prices take potential herd behavior by Investor 3
into account.
21. That is, in this equilibrium information is revealed in the
fastest possible way in the sense that there is no other (rea-
sonable) equilibrium where, at any date t, more informa-
tion is revealed.
22. Subjects were allowed to keep a copy of their ﬁrst-round deci-
sion sheet as a reference for the second round. Importantly,
we made it clear to subjects that second-round decision mak-
ing did not require recalling ﬁrst-round decisions.
23. Drehmann, Oechssler and Roider [2005] conduct an
experiment on information-based herding in ﬁnancial
markets and document behavior that is quite robust across
pricing rules that make different assumptions on the
behavior of investors (e.g., pricing rules that allow for dif-
ferent forms of “mistakes”).
24. The maximum possible bid for an investor was limited to
20 points.
25. That is, in all of the sessions there were six investor groups
in treatment investment and four investor groups in treat-
ment reputation.
26. In both rounds, by experimental design, investors can
never lose more money than the initial endowment of 20
points. If, in treatment reputation, a principal wins many
auctions and happens to hire a number of investors of bad
type, he or she may, in principle, accumulate losses that
exceed the initial endowment of 20 points. We excluded
this possibility by informing principals that the minimum
they could earn were zero points (including the initial
endowment). While, in principle, this constraint might
have given principals an incentive to overbid relative to
what is predicted by Proposition 2, we do not ﬁnd evi-
dence for this. In fact, looking at all principals, there is
even evidence for some underbidding as the average actual
wage bid is equal to 6.28 while Proposition 2 would pre-
dict an average wage bid of 8.25.
27. For each pair of such symmetric information sets (and for
both treatments separately), we conduct McNemar change
tests, which all indicate insigniﬁcant differences.
28. According to a Wilcoxon signed ranks test (where for each
subject, we compare the number of decisions that are in
line with theory in treatment investment respectively in
treatment reputation), this difference is (marginally) sig-
niﬁcant with a p-value of 0.056. This might be indicative
of some learning effects across rounds.
29. In particular, for both treatments separately, we run pair-
wise McNemar change tests comparing behavior at infor-
mation set AAb (BBa) to behavior at each of the other
information sets except BBa (AAb), which all indicate sta-
tistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
30. This remains true if McNemar change tests are separately
applied to behavior at information setsAAb respectively BBa.
31. The model (on which the theoretical predictions in Propo-
sitions 1 and 2 are based) assumes risk-neutrality of
investors and principals. In Question 1 of the (nonincen-
tivized) postexperimental questionnaire, we elicited sub-
jects’ degree of risk-aversion. The question that we use has
been widely employed in survey studies, and it has been
validated in laboratory experiments with substantial stakes
(see, e.g., Dohmen et al. [2011]). In unreported regres-
sions, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant effect of an investor’s degree
of risk-aversion on his tendency to follow his signal. This
holds both in treatment investment and in treatment repu-
tation. It also holds when we only consider decisions at
information sets XXx or XXy.
32. In the postexperimental questionnaire, we asked subjects
whether they believe that investors always decide as sug-
gested by their signals. While 77.77% of subjects thought
that Investor 1 behaves this way, 45.55% thought that
Investor 2 behaves this way and only 11.11% thought that
Investor 3 always follows his signal.
33. For a similar approach to capture the inﬂuence of prede-
cessors’ behavior, see, for example, Drehmann, Oechssler
and Roider [2005].
34. On the one hand, this ﬁnding is intuitive because the
behavior of Investor 2 itself is inﬂuenced by the behavior
of Investor 1 (see Table 2 and the discussion above). On
the other hand, it might be a special feature of the experi-
mental design that there is a well-deﬁned Investor 1 who
has access to objective information only (i.e., his or her
signal), but who is not affected by decisions of earlier
investors (as there are none). Nevertheless, the above ﬁnd-
ing seems to indicate that early investors (who had less
chance to be affected by other investors’ behavior) might
exert an especially large inﬂuence on ﬁnancial market
trends.
35. From a behavioral perspective, it might be possible to
explain the behavior of Investor 3 in treatment investment.
There is ample evidence that decision makers display
asymmetric reactions to good news and bad news in the
sense that bad news tends to be ignored (for a recent con-
tribution, see, e.g., Eil and Rao [2011]). It might be that
Investor 3 interprets XXx (XXy) as good news (bad news)
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because his own signal conﬁrms (goes against) the preex-
isting trend. If this is the case, this might help to explain
Investor 30s tendency to disregard his signal at informa-
tion set XXy. At information sets XYy and XYx, it is less
obvious whether Investor 30s signal is good news or bad
news, and indeed the tendency to follow one’s own signal
does not differ much. Alternatively, it might be that some
investors simply have a preference for conformity, which
leads them to imitate earlier investors.
36. In case of rall (rmax), we compare average wage offers for
successful respectively unsuccessful investors at the princi-
pal level (at the session level).
37. Only in case of an unsuccessful investment, the difference
between wage bids rall given a history XXX and wage bids
rall given any other history is marginally statistically signif-
icant with p D 0.069 (Wilcoxon signed ranks test that
compares average wage bids at the principal level).
38. Note that the history of trades XXY is off the equilibrium
path. In order to calculate the respective payoff difference,
we assume that in this case principals hold the off-equilib-
rium belief that Investor 3 has traded sincerely (which is
in line with the assumption made in Dasgupta and Prat
[2008]).
39. In particular, this also holds for bad types because invest-
ors were assumed to be unaware of their type.
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Appendix A
Wages and investment in the presence of
reputational concerns
In this appendix, we illustrate how, building on Dasgupta
and Prat’s [2008] Proposition 4, the wage bids and
investment behaviors as spelt out in Proposition 2 can be
derived (given the parameter values we have assumed).
In particular, we show that these wage bids and invest-
ment behaviors are mutually best replies. (Note that
while, in principle, the most-revealing equilibrium may
be in mixed strategies, this is not the case given the
parameter values assumed here.)
Wage bids. First, suppose an investor’s equilibrium strat-
egy tells him to invest sincerely (which will be the case for
Investors 1 and 2, and Investor 3 unless both of his or her
predecessors have chosen the same asset). In this case, as
outlined in the section Investors with Reputational Con-
cerns, the equilibrium wage bids for this investor depend
on the ultimate success (respectively failure) of his or her
investment only (i.e., whether V i D y or V i 6¼ y holds).
In particular, the potential wage bids r(V i D y) and r(V i
6¼ y) equal the conditional probabilities of facing a good
type times the good type’s value of 20, where
r ViD n D sg
0:5sbC 0:5sg 
1
2
 
20D 12:86 (4)
r Vi 6¼ n D 1¡ sg
1¡ 0:5sb¡ 0:5sg 
1
2
 
20D 3:33 (5)
Hence, r(V i D y) > r(V i 6¼ y), that is, success of the
investment is more indicative for a good type.
Second, suppose Investors 1 and 2 have chosen the
same asset and Investor 30s strategy tells him or her to
herd in this case. Then, Investor 30s trade does not reveal
any information about their type. Independent of the
success of their investment, they will receive wage offers
that are determined by the prior probability of being a
good type and given by 1/2 20 D 10. (Note that, in line
with Dasgupta and Prat [2008], we assume that if Inves-
tor 3 would deviate and not herd this would imply an
off-equilibrium belief of a sincere trade.)
Investment behavior. We now turn to the behavior of
investors and take the wage offers as spelt out in Proposi-
tion 2 as given. Given a certain realization of their signal,
an investor will compare their expected payoff from trad-
ing sincerely with their expected payoff from trading
against their signal. Denote this payoff difference by DpR
D DpI C Dr, where DpI denotes the expected difference
in the proﬁts from trading per se, where Dr denotes the
expected difference in wages, and where, for ease of
exposition, the arguments of the functions are omitted.
The respective investor trades sincerely whenever DpR >
0 holds (see Equation 3).
Table A1 displays Dr, DpI, and DpR for all informa-
tion sets of the game. In order to illustrate how the
entries of Table A1 are calculated, suppose that investor i
has received signal si D a and faces history Ht (recall that
investor i buys at time t D i only). In this case, we have
DrDPr vDA j a;Htð Þ r vDViDAð Þ¡ r v 6¼ ViDBð Þ½ 
CPr vDB j a;Htð Þ½r v 6¼ ViDA ¡ r vDViDB : (6)
For example, suppose it is Investor 3 who has received
an a-signal and, in addition, both predecessors buy Asset
B. In this case, Investor 3 would update to an probability
of 0.7 of Asset A being the unsuccessful one. Not trading
sincerely (V i D B) would reveal no information about
Investor 30s type to the principal (as this would be in line
with the candidate equilibrium strategy), and as a conse-
quence Investor 3 receives a wage of 10. In contrast, if
Investor 3 would deviate and purchase asset A, the prin-
cipals would hold an off-equilibrium belief of sincere
trading and, depending on the success of the investment,
offer a wage of either 12.86 or 3.33. As a consequence, in
this case, Equation 6 would imply Dr D 3/10 (12.86 –
Table A1. Expected payoff differences from following respec-
tively acting against one’s signal in treatment reputation.
Investor Information Set Pr yDA j si;HtD ið Þ Dr DpI DpR
1 a 0.7 3.81 4.0 7.81
1 b 0.3 3.81 4.0 7.81
2 Aa 0.84 6.48 3.4 10.88
2 Bb 0.16 6.48 3.4 10.88
2 Ab or Ba 0.5 0.0 3.4 3.4
3 ABa or BAa 0.7 3.81 4.0 7.81
3 ABb or BAb 0.3 3.81 4.0 7.81
3 AAa 0.93 8.20 2.3 10.5
3 BBb 0.07 8.20 2.3 10.5
3 AAb 0.7 ¡3.81 2.3 ¡1.51
3 BBa 0.3 ¡3.81 2.3 ¡1.51
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10) C 7/10 (3.33 – 10) D ¡3.81. At the same time, in the
present case, we have DpI D 9.3 – 7.0 D 2.3: while the
expected payoff from trading sincerely is zero, when fol-
lowing the herd Investor 3 has to pay a market price of
9.3 for Asset B, which according to the information he or
she holds has an expected value of 7 only (see Table 1).
Hence, DpR D DpI C Dr D 2.3 – 3.81 D ¡1.51, and
Investor 3 should optimally herd in this case. (As dis-
cussed in the section Investors with Reputational Con-
cerns, the asset prices presented to subjects are
calculated under the assumption that trade is sincere in
both treatments. If, in line with Dasgupta and Prat
[2008], the market maker would anticipate herding by
Investor 3 and set asset prices accordingly, in the present
case one would have DpI D 1.4 and DpR D¡2.41. Hence,
the same theoretical prediction would emerge.)
All remaining values of Dr, DpI, and DpR are derived
in a completely analogous way.
Appendix B
Experimental instructions: English translation
As discussed in the section Experimental Design, both
rounds of a session had the same basic structure. The
instructions for the respective round were handed to
subjects and read out aloud by the experimenter. In
addition, the main features of the respective round
were explained via a ﬂip chart to subjects. Decision
sheets for the respective round were only distributed
after all subjects had correctly completed a question-
naire about details of the experimental setup. In the
second round, investors and observers faced slightly
different questions, where the wording was adjusted to
take account of the different roles of the participants.
The below instructions contain the second-round
questionnaire that principals had to complete. Partici-
pants were given the opportunity to record their ﬁrst-
round decisions on a separate sheet of paper, to which
they had access in the second round of the experiment.
Importantly, we made it clear to subjects that second-
round decision making did not require recalling ﬁrst-
round decisions. Only after the second round, pay-
ments were calculated, subjects answered a postexperi-
mental questionnaire requesting demographic
information as well as asking questions about the
experiment. Finally, payments were privately handed
out to subjects, after which the experiment ended.
All phrases emphasized in the subsequent translation
were also emphasized in the original instructions. Square
brackets contain explanations intended for the reader
and were not part of the original instructions.
Instructions
Welcome
Welcome to our experiment. The laboratory for experi-
mental economics—AWI Lab—at the Department of
Economics of the University of Heidelberg (game admin-
istrator: Professor Roider) aims to test various scientiﬁc
theories with this experiment.
Payment
By participating in the experiment, you support our sci-
entiﬁc work. You are guaranteed to receive 4 Euros. At
the same time, you may earn additional money through
your decisions in the experiment.
A more detailed explanation of how your payment is
calculated will be provided later. Each point earned in
our experiment corresponds to 0.20 Euro. The experi-
ment will take approximately 120 minutes.
The experiment
The experiment consists of two rounds that are
completely independent of each other. In each round the
players are randomly assigned to groups (which will
change from round to round), and players will have to
take investment decisions. To aid you in your decision,
you will receive information about the potential success
of various investments and you will learn the decisions
of your predecessors in your group.
Now, on to the game!
[Start of instructions for Round 1]
Round 1
The investment decision
Each group consists of three investors, who sequentially
make investment decisions. Each investor must choose
between two shares (A and B). Only one share will turn
out to be successful and have a value of 10 points at the
end. The other share will turn out to be worthless and
have a value of 0 points. Which share is successful, is
determined randomly before the ﬁrst investor of the
respective group makes his decision. Hence, the same
share is successful for all investors in your group. With-
out additional information you can rely on the fact that
in 50% of cases Share A is successful and in 50% of cases
Share B is successful.
Additional information
Each investor can observe the investment decisions of
his or her predecessors in his or her group.
Moreover, prior to making his decision, every investor
receives an additional tip about whether Share A or B is
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successful. The reliability of the tip depends on which of
two possible sources of information the investor can
draw on: a good source of information or a bad source
of information. Which of the two sources of informa-
tion is available to a given investor is determined
randomly, and may differ across investors even within a
given group. For each investor, the probability of draw-
ing on a good source of information is the same and
equal to 50%. Likewise, for each investor, the probability
of drawing on a bad source of information is 50%.
Each investor knows neither the quality of his or her
source of information nor the quality of the source of
information any other investor is drawing on.
Bad source of information. Investors who “draw on a
bad source of information” are privately shown a ball
that is randomly drawn from an urn containing 5 “A-
Balls” and 5 “B-Balls.” For each of these investors, a new
ball is drawn from this 5:5 urn (where the respective ball
is returned to the urn after it has been shown to the
respective investor). Consequently, these investorsmight
be receiving different tips.
Good source of information. Investors who “draw on a
good source of information” are privately shown a ball
that is randomly drawn from an urn where the number
of A-Balls and B-Balls in the urn depends on which asset
is successful. If Asset A is successful, the urn contains 9
A-Balls and 1 B-Ball. If, however, Asset B is successful,
the urn contains 9 B-Balls and 1 A-Ball. For each of the
investors who can draw on a good source of information
a new ball is drawn from this 9:1 urn (where the respec-
tive ball is returned to the urn after it has been shown to
the respective investor). Consequently, these investors
might be receiving different tips too.
Each investor knows his own tip only and does not
observe the tips other investors have received.
Summary. Each investor in your group faces the same
problem as you do. He has to choose between Share A
and Share B. Each investor receives a tip in form of an
A-Ball or a B-Ball, which only he or she can observe.
Each investor knows neither the quality of their source
of information nor the quality of the source of informa-
tion any other investor is drawing on. However, prior to
making their decision, each investor can observe the
decisions of their predecessors in their group (if applica-
ble), and they can observe the prices (and history of pri-
ces) of the shares.
Prices
Each investor who decides on buying a certain share has
to pay the current share price. The current price of a
given share is adjusted upward or downward on the basis
of the observed investment decisions by the experimenter.
Each investor receives an endowment of 20 points for
Round 1 of the experiment.
We elicit your decision for every possible scenario
In the following, we will ask for your decision for every
possible scenario that may occur.
In particular, you will be asked to put yourself in the
shoes of Investor 1 and to make a decision for the case
that you are shown an A-Ball as well as for the case that
you are shown a B-Ball. Subsequently, you will be asked
to put yourself in the shoes of Investor 2 and to make a
decision for every possible combination of Investor 10s
decision and tip that you might receive.
Finally, you will be asked to put yourself in the shoes
of Investor 3 and to again make decisions for every possi-
ble scenario.
Calculation of your payment
How do we calculate the payment that you receive at the
end of the experiment? Once the experiment has ended
and after all investment decisions have been made, for
each group the experimenter will randomly determine
who occupies the role of Investor 1, Investor 2, and Inves-
tor 3. Subsequently, for each group there will be random
draws (according to the rules described above) that deter-
mine (a) which share is the successful one, (b) from which
urn the tip for the respective investor is picked, and (c)
the tip that the respective investor is shown.
As an example, suppose that you have been assigned
the role of Investor 1, and an A-Ball has been drawn for
Investor 1. In this case, the decision you made for Inves-
tor 1 given that he or she is shown an A-Ball would
determine your payment.
Now, suppose that you have been assigned the role of
Investor 2. Furthermore, suppose that your group’s
Investor 1 has bought Share B (given the random draws
speciﬁed above), and an A-Ball has been drawn for
Investor 2. In this case, the decision you made for Inves-
tor 2 in the scenario (Investor 1 bought B, your tip: A-
Ball) would determine your payment.
Completely analogous, if you have been assigned the
role of Investor 3, your payment is determined by the
decision you made in the relevant scenario (i.e., given
your predecessors’ decisions and own tip that are
selected according to the rules just described).
Hence, by the above procedure, one of your decisions
is selected and determines your payment. The number of
points that results from this decision depends on the
true value of the share you have bought and the share
price you have paid. In any case, the share price you
have paid is deducted from your endowment. This will
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be your payment for the current round if your share is
not the successful one. If, on the other hand, the share
you have bought is successful, you receive 10 additional
points. Hence, one of the decisions you have made in
this round determines your payment.
The composition of groups will remain anonymous.
You will not learn the identity of your fellow investors.
Have you understood everything?
Before you continue, please answer the following questions
so that we can ensure that you have understood everything:
1. Before you observe a ball: What is the probability
that Share A is the successful one?
 50%
 90%
2. Suppose that you have access to the good source of
information. What is the probability that you
observe a ball that represents the correct share?
 50%
 90%
3. What is the probability that you observe a ball
from the good source of information?
 50%
 90%
4. What kind of information does Investor 1 receive
before he or she makes their decision?
 Their tip in form of a ball and the share prices
 Their tip in form of a ball and the quality of
their source of information
 Their tip in form of a ball, the quality of their
source of information, and which of the shares
has a value of 10
5. What kind of information does Investor 2 receive
before he or she makes their decision?
 Their tip in form of a ball, and current and past
share prices
 Their tip in form of a ball and the quality of
their source of information
 Their tip in form of a ball, current and past
share prices, and the decision of Investor 1
 Their tip in form of a ball, the quality of their
source of information, and which of the shares
has a value of 10
6. What kind of information does Investor 3 receive
before he or she makes their decision?
 Their tip in form of a ball, the quality of their
source of information, and which of the shares
has a value of 10
 Their tip in form of a ball and the quality of
their source of information
 Their tip in form of a ball, and current and past
share prices
 Their tip in form of a ball, current and past share
prices, and the decisionsmade by Investors 1 and 2
7. Suppose that Investor 1 observes an A-Ball as a tip.
What tip will Investor 2 receive?
 Investor 2 will also observe an A-Ball
 A new ball is drawn for Investor 2
8. Suppose that both Investor 1 and Investor 2 receive
an A-Ball as a tip.What tip will Investor 3 receive?
 Investor 3 will also observe an A-Ball
 A new ball is drawn for Investor 3
9. Suppose that you have bought Share A and that
Share A has a value of 10 points. The purchase
price amounts to 7 points. Your endowment is 20
points. What is your payment for this round?
 10 – 7 D 3
 20 C 7 – 10 D 17
 20 C 10 – 7 D 23
 20 – 7 D 13
10. Suppose that you have bought Share A and that
Share A has a value of 0 points. The purchase price
amounts to 4 points. Your endowment is 20
points. What is your payment for this round?
 20 – 4 D 16
 20 C 10 – 4 D 26
 ¡4
 10 – 4 D 6
[Participants have to answer all questions. Answers are
checked. Only after all participants answer all questions cor-
rectly, the following decision sheets are distributed.]
Scenarios in round 1
Your task
Put yourself in Investor 10s shoes. Suppose you receive
a certain ball as a tip, and subsequently you have to
decide whether to buy Share A or Share B at the indi-
cated price. Bold print indicates the price you have to
pay for Share A respectively Share B. Now, for each of
the scenarios described below, please state whether you
want to buy Share A or Share B:
Scenario 1
Price of Share A 7,0
Price of Share B 7,0
You receive an A-Ball. I buy: o Share A o Share B
Scenario 2
Price of Share A 7,0
Price of Share B 7,0
You receive a B-Ball. I buy: o Share A o Share B
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Now, put yourself in Investor 20s shoes. Suppose you
observe both Investor 10s decision and the movement of
share prices. In addition, you receive a certain ball as a
tip. Now, for each of the scenarios described below,
please state whether you want to buy Share A or Share B
at the indicated price (in bold print). That is, the price
in bold print is the price you have to pay for Share A
respectively Share B. The prices to the left are the prices
that your respective predecessors had to pay.
[The structure of the remaining two scenarios that
Investor 2 may face is completely analogous, and there-
fore these scenarios are omitted from this translation of
the experimental instructions.]
Now, put yourself in Investor 30s shoes. Suppose you
observe the investment decisions of the ﬁrst two investors
and the movement of share prices. In addition, you receive
a certain ball as a tip. Now, for each of the scenarios
described below, please state whether you want to buy
Share A or Share B at the indicated price (in bold print).
That is, the price in bold print is the price you have to pay
for Share A respectively Share B. The prices to the left are
the prices that your respective predecessors had to pay.
[The structure of the remaining six scenarios that
Investor 3 may face is completely analogous, and there-
fore these scenarios are omitted from this translation of
the experimental instructions.]
[End of instructions for Round 1 and start of instruc-
tions for Round 2]
Round 2
In Round 2, for investors the rules of the game are the
same as in Round 1; only the calculation of the compen-
sation differs, and, in addition to investors, there will
now also be observers. If you have just drawn a card with
an I, you are still an investor. If you have just drawn a
card with a B, you now act as an observer. Thereby, out
of all Round 1 investors, we have anonymously and ran-
domly selected 6 participants, who now assume the role
of observers.
Observers do not invest, but evaluate the investment
decisions made by the investors. The observers are not
part of any investor group. The identity of both investors
and observers will not be revealed.
Except for how their compensation is calculated,
nothing changes for investors.
Calculation of your payment
This stays the same:
As in Round 1, we will ask for your decision for every
possible scenario that may occur.
Again, each investor and each observer receives an
endowment of 20 points for Round 2.
After the experiment, i.e., after all investors and observ-
ers have made their decisions, the experimenter will again
randomly allocate investors to groups. That is, in Round 2
each investor has different groupmembers than in Round 1.
Again, the roles of Investor 1, Investor 2, and Investor 3 will
be assigned randomly. Again, for each group in Round 2
there will be randomdraws (according to the rules described
above) that determine (a) which share is the successful one,
(b) from which urn the tip for the respective investor is
picked, and (c) the tip that the respective investor is shown.
Hence, by the above procedure, the decision that
determines the payment is selected. That is, as before,
one of the decisions an investor makes in this round will
determine his or her payment.
This changes:
The true values of the shares continue to affect the invest-
ors’ compensation. However, the observers’ compensation
does not depend on the true values of the shares.
The additional compensation that an investor receives
depends on the evaluation by the observers. In particular,
the observers do no longer decide between the two shares.
Instead, observers now have to estimate with which proba-
bility an investor had access to a good sources of informa-
tion when making his or her investment decision, and they
will offer wages to individual investors.
Scenario 1
Investor 1 2 3
Price of Share A 7,0 8,4 7,0
Price of Share B 7,0 5,0 7,0
Decision A B ?
You receive an A-Ball. I buy: o Share A o Share B
Scenario 2
Investor 1 2 3
Price of Share A 7,0 8,4 7,0
Price of Share B 7,0 5,0 7,0
Decision A B ?
You receive a B-Ball. I buy: o Share A o Share B
Scenario 1
Investor 1 2
Price of Share A 7,0 8,4
Price of Share B 7,0 5,0
Decision A ?
You receive an A-Ball. I buy: o Share A o Share B
Scenario 2
Investor 1 2
Price of Share A 7,0 5,0
Price of Share B 7,0 8,4
Decision B ?
You receive an A-Ball. I buy: o Share A o Share B
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Observers are willing to offer a wage because, by employ-
ing an investor with a good source of information, they can
earn points. If an observer hires an investor who has access
to a good source of information, employing the investor is
helpful and the observer receives additional 20 points. An
observer does not beneﬁt from hiring an investor with a bad
source of information. In this case, the observer receives no
additional points.
For each possible scenario and each investor, the 6
observers have to submit wage offers between
0 and amaximumof 20 points (which theywould bewill-
ing to pay for the respective investor). The observer submit-
ting the highest of the 6 wage offers for a given investor (in a
given scenario) hires the respective investor and pays the
investor the wage offer he hasmade. The remaining 5 observ-
ers (who did not submit the highest wage offer) do not receive
additional points, but also do not have to pay any wage. Now,
there are 4 investor groups with a total of 12 investors.
The observers submit their wage offers at a point in
time when the true values of the shares can already be
observed. On top of that, the observers can only observe
the investment decisions of the individual investors and
the movement of share prices. They do not observe the
tips that investors have received, and they do not observe
the qualities of investors’ sources of information.
Sequence of events
As in Round 1, after all investors and observers have
made their decisions for all possible scenarios, for each
group the decisions that determine the compensation
and the true values of the shares are determined.
The wage offers of the 6 observers for a given investor in
the thus determined setting are compared, and the highest
bidding observer wins the respective bid. Thereby, for each
investor in each group, both the wage and which observer
pays this wage are determined.
It is important to remember that observers do not
learn investors’ tips and source of information. Observ-
ers only observe the investment decisions, the true values
of the shares, and the movement of share prices.
The points you will receive are calculated as follows:
Payment to observers
If an observer has submitted the highest bid for a given
investor, he or she pays their bid as a wage to the respective
investor. If the respective investor has a good source of
information, the observer receives an additional 20 points. If
multiple observers submit the same (highest) bid for a par-
ticular investor, the winning bidder is determined randomly.
Observer who have not submitted the highest bid do not
have to pay a wage and do not receive any additional points.
Consequently, a given observer may submit the win-
ning bid for none, one, multiple, or even all 12 of the
investor(s). Please note: If an observer would incur an
overall loss, he or she will earn 0 points for this round.
Hence, observers’ decisions affect both their own as
well as investors’ compensation.
Payment to investors
An investor’s total compensation is determined by his or
her initial endowment, the true value of the share he or
she has bought minus the share price he or she has paid,
and the wage received from one of the observers.
[The below version of the questionnaire had to be
completed by observers. Investors faced slightly different
questions, where the wording was adjusted to take
account of the different role of the subject.]
Have you understood everything?
Before you continue, please answer the following questions
so that we can ensure that you have understood everything:
1. Suppose that you have submitted a wage offer of 9
points and won the bid. The investor whom you
are, hence, employing has bought Share A, and
Share A has a true value of 10 points. The investor
has an initial endowment of 20 points and has
bought Share A for a price of 6 points. Moreover,
the investor has a good source of information.
(a)What is the investor’s total compensation in the
current round?
 9 C 10 – 6 C 20 C 20 D 53
 9 C 20 D 29
 9 C 10 – 6 C 20 D 33
(b)What is your payoff from employing this inves-
tor (excluding your initial endowment)?
 20 – 9 D 11
 20 C 10 C 9 – 6 D 33
 9 C 20 D 29
(c)What would your compensation have been if
the investor had had a bad source of informa-
tion and you had won the bid (excluding your
initial endowment)?
 0 – 9 D ¡9
 20 C 10 C 9 – 6 C 0 D 33
 9 C 0 D 9
(d)Now, suppose that the share has a true value of
0 points. What is the investor’s total
compensation?
 9 C 0 – 6 C 20 C 20 D 43
 9 C 20 D 29
 9 C 0 – 6 C 20 D 23
2. You and one other observer have bid 14 points for
an investor. Who wins?
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 Both of the observers win the bid. The proﬁt is
shared equally.
 The winner is selected randomly
 None of the observers wins the bid
3. To what kind of information do you have access
when deciding on your wage offer?
 The investors’ sources of information and the
true values of the shares
 The tips the investors have received and the true
values of the shares
 The investors’ decisions and the movement of
prices
 The investors’ decisions, the movement of pri-
ces, and the true values of the shares
[Participants have to answer all questions. Answers
are checked. Only after all participants answer all ques-
tions correctly, decision sheets are distributed. Investors
and observers are handed different decision sheets,
where each group only observes its own decision sheet.]
Scenarios in round 2 [decision sheet of investors]
Please note: Round 2 and Round 1 are independent of
each other.
[The remainder of the Round 2 decision sheet of
investors is identical to the Round 1 decision sheet dis-
played above, and it is therefore omitted from this trans-
lation of the experimental instructions.]
Scenarios in round 2 [decision sheet of observers]
Your task
Below, we display all scenarios that may occur. For each
scenario, please indicate what wage offer between 0 and
20 you want to make for Investor 1, Investor 2, and
Investor 3, respectively. In each case, you can observe the
movement of prices, the prices each investor faced,
which share each investor bought, and which of the
shares turned out to be successful.
[The structure of Scenarios 2 through 15 that an
observer may face is completely analogous, and therefore
these scenarios are omitted from this translation of the
experimental instructions.]
[After subjects hand in their Round 2 decision
sheets they answer the following postexperimental
questionnaire.]
Personal data and questionnaire
Thank you for participating in the experiment. We will
now calculate your total points, convert it into Euros,
and then hand you your payment. This may take a few
minutes. In the meantime, we would like to ask you to
complete the following questionnaire.
Please do not talk to other participants and please
refrain from using your cell phone until the end of the
experiment.
As soon as we have determined your payoff, we will
call your number.
Thank you again for your participation!
Personal data
Please answer the following questions. Of course, the
results of the experiment will be anonymized, and it will
not be possible to connect the results to your personal
data. The information you share with us will be used for
scientiﬁc purposes only.
[Data entry ﬁelds for age, gender, student status, PhD
status, ﬁeld of studies, year of studies.]
Questionnaire
We would like to ask you to answer the following
questions.
1. What would you do in the following situation?
Suppose you have just won 100,000 Euros in a lot-
tery. Immediately after receiving this money, you
are offered the following lottery: There is a chance
to double your money, but, at the same time, it is
equally possible that you could lose half of the
amount you invested.
You can wager your entire 100,000 Euros, a frac-
tion thereof, or you can choose not to take part in
this lottery at all.
What fraction of your winnings do you want to wager
on this risky, but potentially proﬁtable lottery?
 the entire 100,000 Euros
 80,000 Euros
 60,000 Euros
Scenario 1
Investor 1 2 3
Price of Share A 7,0 8,4 7,0
Price of Share B 7,0 5,0 7,0
Decision A B A Successful share: A
Your wage offer for Investor 1: 
Your wage offer for Investor 2: 
Your wage offer for Investor 3: 
Scenario 16
Investor 1 2 3
Price of Share A 7,0 5,0 3,0
Price of Share B 7,0 8,4 9,3
Decision B B B Successful share: B
Your wage offer for Investor 1: 
Your wage offer for Investor 2: 
Your wage offer for Investor 3: 
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 40,000 Euros
 20,000 Euros
 Nothing, I would not take part in this lottery
2. Do you think that Investor 1 always has decided as
suggested by the tip he or she has received?
3. Do you think that Investor 2 always has decided as
suggested by the tip he or she has received? If not:
When did he or she not act in line with his or her tip?
4. Do you think that Investor 3 always has decided as
suggested by the tip he or she has received? If not:
When did he or she not act in line with his or her tip?
5. When acting as an investor, did you base your
decisions on the tips you received or on the other
investors’ decisions?
6. What do you think was the purpose of this
experiment?
7. In your daily decision making, are you inclined to
follow
 other people’s advice
 your own assessment
 other people’s advice in some situations and my
own assessment in others
Thank you for ﬁlling out the questionnaire and for
taking part in the experiment.
Please wait until your number is called.
Appendix C
Example for how individual payoffs were calculated
in the experiment
In the following, we provide an example of how subjects’
payoffs were calculated in treatment reputation. In each
session of treatment reputation, 6 randomly selected sub-
jects acted as principals, while the remaining 12 subjects
acted as investors. For the sake of the example, denote
the 12 subjects who acted as investors by Sj for j D 1,
…,12. As discussed in the section Experimental Design,
after all subjects had handed in their decision sheets,
individual payoffs of subjects were calculated in the fol-
lowing way. In a step (i), the 12 investors are randomly
allocated into 4 groups of 3 investors each, and the roles
of investors 1, 2, and 3 are randomly assigned. Suppose
that this random draw leads to one of these groups being
comprised of S2, S5, and S4, who act as investors 1, 2, and
3, respectively. Furthermore, suppose that (as described
in the section Experimental Design) in the random
draws of step (ii), it turns out that asset A is the success-
ful one, S2 is a good type and receives signal a, S5 is a
good type and receives signal b, and S4 is a bad type and
receives signal b. Then, from the decision sheet of S2 (see
Appendix B), we look up S2’s decision given that he or
she plays Investor 1 and has received signal a. Let’s say
S2’s decision is to buy A. Subsequently, we turn to S5’s
decision sheet (who in the current example acts as Inves-
tor 2). There, we look up his or her decision given that
Investor 1 has chosen A and S5 has received signal b.
Let’s say S5’s decision is to buy B. Lastly, we turn to S4’s
decision sheet (who in the current example acts as Inves-
tor 3). There, we look up his or her decision given that
Investor 1 has chosen A, Investor 2 has chosen B, and S4
has received signal b. Let’s say S4’s decision is to buy A.
Thereby, we have determined the payoff-relevant decisions
of S2, S5, and S4 (which are given by A, B, and A, respec-
tively). Moreover, given that in the present example asset A
is the successful one, we can now calculate each investor’s
payoff that he or she obtains from buying the respective
asset (where it turns out that S2 and S4 bought the success-
ful Asset A, while S5 bought the unsuccessful Asset B).
To determine the wages of S2, S5, and S4, we pro-
ceed in the following way. In the decision sheets of the
six principals we look up the principals’ wage offers
for Investor 1, Investor 2, and Investor 3 given a his-
tory of decisions H4 2 {ABA} and given that A is the
successful asset (see Scenario 1 in the decision sheet of
principals in Appendix B). S2 (who, in the present
example, acted as Investor 1) will then receive as a
wage the highest offer made for Investor 1, and the
respective highest-bidding principal gets a payoff from
employing S2 (i.e., 20 minus the wage, because, in the
present example, S2 is a good type). Likewise, S5 (who,
in the present example, acted as Investor 2) will then
receive as a wage the highest offer made for Investor
2, and the respective highest-bidding principal gets a
payoff from employing S5 (i.e., 20 minus the wage,
because, in the present example, 20 minus the wage,
because, in the present example is a good type).
Finally, S4 (who, in the present example, acted as
Investor 3) will then receive as a wage the highest offer
made for Investor 3, and the respective highest-bid-
ding principal gets a payoff from employing S4 (i.e., 0
minus the wage, because, in the present example, S4 is
a bad type).
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